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ABSTRACT 
An important component of the federal budget is programs to 
develop and to commercial ize new technology. This paper applies recent 
developments in the rational actor theory of political behavior to 
examine the politics of these programs. The principal theoretical 
conclusions are that government commercialization projects are 
relatively unattractive as particularistic distributive programs, but 
that once a project is begun, the political incentives are to rush the 
research phase and get on with demonstration, to continue unlucky 
efforts after their expected payoffs are known not to be worth their 
costs, and to redefine the goals of the program so as to deemphasize 
the initial objective of commercial adoption. These conclusions are 
then tested by examining LWO recent projects : the Clinch River Breeder 
Reactor and the space shuttle. Both programs appear to illustrate the 
probl ems predicted by the theory. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOITERNMl!:NT PROGRAMS 
TO PROMOTE NEW TECHNOLOGY 
By Linda Cohen and Koger Noll 
An important and largely unstudied domain of government policy 
is programs to commercialize new technologies. This arena of public 
policy is hardly new. Samuel Morse's tirst telegraph line, between 
Baltimore and Washington, was tinanced by a $30,000 appropriation trom 
Congress ( Brock ( 1981] , p. 56), and high-yield, hybrid seeds were 
d eveloped and promoted by the Department of Agriculture ( Gril liches 
(1957] and Rosenberg (197 1] ). Nevertheless, this federal activity has 
shown marked growth since the introduction of the Atoms tor Peace 
program in the 1950s -- tne program that gave us commercial nuclear 
power plants. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political 
foundations of policies LO promote new technology : how they come 
about, and how political forces affect their performance. Our 
theoretical approach is rational choice theory, and our focus is 
Congressional decisions. The programs of interest are attempts by Lhe 
fe deral government LO cause the private sector to adopt an identitiable 
new technology. Such programs invol ve more than support for research, 
or passive methoas of subsidizing innovators and entrepreneurs. The 
special characteristics of these programs are that they place the 
2 
government in tne role of deciding which technology ought to be adopted 
by a specific industry, and that they involve developing a commercial 
demonstratiun project. 
Recent example s of the programs we have in mind are the 
following : 
(1) The �olony Project in we stern �olorado which,
until canceled, was supposed to demon strace a 
commercially-viable method for producing fuel 
from oil shale; 
(2) The �pace �nuttle, wnich was intended to 
demon strate the feasibility of inexpensive, 
reusable launch systems tor numerous commercial 
use s of space; 
(3J The �linch River Breeder Reactor, which was 
supposed co prove tne commercial feasibility of 
fuel-efficient, sodium-cooled nuclear reactors; and 
(4) The Supersonic Transport, or SST, which was 
intended to re sult in an economical ly sound nigh­
s peed jet pas senger aircraft. 
The key feature s of the se programs are as tollows. First, tney 
requiLe overcoming significant technical barriers if they are to be 
succ e s s ful. Second, the government commit s  itself not JUSt to 
as sisting in solving the key technical problem s, but to seeing the 
program through its first commercial applications. Third, the stated 
objective of tne program is economic : to reduce costs or enhance 
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performance by a sufficient amount to provide an efficiency 
justification for the project. Fourth, de spite the third criterion, 
tne private sector is unable or unwilling to undertake tne project on 
its own. 
The paper pre sume s that the set of projects that could sati sfy
aLl four criteria is not empty. There are theoretic grounds for 
believing that in some circumstance s the private sector lacks 
sufficient incentive to develop warranted new technology, and example s 
in wnich government commercialization project s were succe s sful. What 
we seek to examine is the corre spondence between projects that are 
economically justifiable and projects that are politically feasible 
that is, projects that serve tne intere sts of legislators seeking 
reelection or politica1 advancement. We also seek to determine how 
political incentive s affect tne probability that a project wil l 
succe ed. 
The principal conclusions trom our analysis are as follows. 
First, in comparison to other large construction expenditure s,  
demonstration programs nave no special political attractions yet do 
have some political liabiliti e s; hence we would expect them to be 
undertaken only under spec ial political conditions which we elaborate. 
Second, given that a demon stration program initially is economical ly 
warranted and politica1 ly feasible, a project that turns out to be a 
poor one will be continued longer that it should -- e.g., government 
systematically is slow to cut losses t ram promising ideas that turn 
sour. Third, given a warranted and feasible project, the government 
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systematicalLy move s too quickly from re search to development, and from 
deve1opment to commercial demonstration, which means that some good 
projects wi1l actually turn out co be failure s even though, with better 
management, they would have succeeded. 
The s tructure of the paper is as tollows. Section I s e t s  forth 
the theoretical arguments in support of the se conclusions. Section II 
discus ses two specific cas e s, the Clinch Kiver Breeder Reactor and the 
Space Shuttle, that support them. Section III contain s a concluding 
discus sion. 
I. TH�ORY 
In thi s  section we develop a theoretical analysis ot the 
political incentive s facing legislators with re spect LO decision s about 
whether to undertake, to continue or to cancel a developmental re search 
project. In this analysis, we seek to make two kinds of comparison s. 
First, at each stage how doe s an economically warranted developmental 
re search project compare politically wich alternative expenditure 
programs that are available to Congre s s ?  Second, to what ext ent are 
there difference s between politically attractive and economically 
warranted deci sions? We adopt a broad def inition of economic 
justification. We include tne increased prof ics of tne private 
companie s  that adopt the technology, the increase in benefit s to 
consumer s in lower price s and /or higher quality ( e. g. increased 
con sumer surplus),  and spillover e f f ects in the development of other 
t echnologie s  or in other areas of public policy ( national defen se and 
foreign relations being two examples}, It is the latter two element s 
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that con stitute the basis for justifications on economic efficiency 
ground s  tor government to play an active role in developing and 
promoting new technology. Our purpose is not co examine tne validity 
of the se Justifications, but to examine whether political incentive s 
cause them to be pursued efficiently. For an analysis of ju stification 
for government participation in commercialization, and an extensive 
bibliography, see  Schmalen see (1980). 
The Economic s of Commercialization Pro1ects 
A nece s sary preamble to the political analysis is to e stablish 
a conceptual baseline regarding the economics of commercialization 
projects. Borrowing from the work of Lee [1983] , we will outline the 
characc eristics of an economically optimal commercialization project in 
which tne optimum plan take s correct account of the. public objective s 
that might motivate government action. Once a general understanding ot 
optimal R&D is in hand, we can f ilter the decision points in the 
optimal plan through a political analysis to determine whether and now 
electoral incentive s might affect them. 
A program to commercialize a new technology, whether public or 
private, has four distinct phase s : re search, prototype, demon stration 
and adoption. Initially, there is uncertainty about precisely how to 
proceed. Several alternative approache s to solving key technical 
problem s are promising, but none are certain to work and l ittle basis 
exi st s  for choo sing among them. Tne number of such alternative s,  and 
the degree of uncertainty as sociated with each, depend on how radical a 
change in technology is cont emplated. More radical approache s 
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generally possess more alternative paths of development and greater 
uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcome of the proj ect. 
Tue initial pha se consists of a relatively l arge number of 
small research projects. Most of the expenditures are on re search 
personnel, who are given relatively great latitude in what to 
investigate and how to proceed. At this stage specific components of 
the proj ect are dif f icult to defend on other than highly sophisticated  
technical grounds or even the hunches of sophisticated researchers. 
In this phase tne appl ication of more resources is most likely 
to encounter severely decreasing returns. Attempts to spe ed up 
re search by increasing appropriations are, beyond a point, likely to 
l ead primarily to duplication of effort rather than greater rate s of 
progress. In large, research-oriented companies, this phase is more or 
l ess continuous -- a research group is continual ly exploring new 
opportunities, and cancellation of one proj ect causes the group to move 
on to exploring another. 
The second phase of a proj ect invol ves the production of 
prototypes and pilots. It takes place when research has narrowed the 
uncertainties regarding the alternatives, permitting managers to make 
distinction s among them according to their promise. Prototypes and 
pi!ots require constructing working mode!s ot at least the maj or new 
subsystems, and sometimes of the entire system. Consequently, they 
invol ve people other then research scient ists and engineers, and 
substantially great�r expenditures in pro curement and construction, 
than are needed in the research phase. The rate of expenditure 
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required to sustain an alternative through this phase is substantial ly 
greater than in the initial phase, expenditures are spread over a more 
heterogeneous group of people, and the outcome is l e ss uncertain. 
Because of the differences in economic requirements, onl y  a f ew  
alternative lines o f  development can b e  pursued  into this stage; most 
are terminated during the initial stage. Finally, whether in the 
public or private sectors, these proj ects are intermittent. If one is 
canceled or compl eted, another does not necessarily take its place. 
Because some of tue expenditures in tne intermediate stage are 
for constructing and testing a physical model,  work is more amenable to 
variations in the rate at which it is accomplished than in the research 
phase. But there are limits arising from the fact that prototypes and 
pilots sti!l have uncertain performance, and tne process of building 
and testing them feeds back on research proj ects. Indeed, that is the 
point of having this phase. Consequently, tne prototype phase also has 
a narrow range ot variation in rates of progress without making 
substantial sacrifices of efficiency, and is uncertain regarding its 
ultimate succe ss. 
The third phase is the demonstration proj ect: the Clinch R iver 
reactor or the Columbia orbitor. On rare occasions two technical 
alternatives reach the demonstration stage, but the common number is 
one. Demonstratiun proj ects are intended to solve a few remaining 
technical probl ems that can only be tacklea in a ful l-scale model,  and 
to show that it is possible to build a commercially interesting 
f aci!ity with re spect to scale, cost and performance. They are 
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normalLy much larger than p ilots and prototype s, and sometime s are the 
first attempt to combine all of the subsystems into a working 
technology. Con sequently, a demon s tration proj ect is normally much 
more expensive than a prototype. Moreover, because it i s  intended to 
prove a technology more than to be a mean s for further development, it 
normally involve s relatively little re search. Most  of the expenditure s  
aLe for procurement and con s truction. A t  thi s  pha se, tne proj ect i s  
more amenable to speed-ups and slow-downs without a major sacrifice ot 
erf iciency. 
The fourth phase is  commercial adoption. It occur s wnen the 
potential u sers of the technology, after observing the demon s tration, 
decide that the economic and technical characteristics of the new 
technology warrant its regular u s e  in commercial activities. 
Developing the econom ically o ptimal R&D plan require s solving a 
complicated dynamic progrannning problem. The solution i s  a sequence of 
deci sions about which alternative s to pursue in each stage, when to 
cancel further inve s tigation of an alternative, and when �o switch from 
one stage to another, with each decision contingent upon the 
information that thusfar has been obtained from the ongoing proj ects. 
The optimal contingency plan will maximize the expected net benefits of 
the proj ect; for a ri sk�neutral government manager, thi s would be the 
di scounted pre sent value of the ne t social benefit, using the correct 
social ra Le of discount and including the range of con sequence s 
discussed at the outset. 
The net benefit of the proj ect hinge s on its total cost and the 
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ultimate performance of the new technology. Other than some posible 
technical spillovers as the proj ect progr e s se s, the gross  economic 
benefits  of tne proj ect virtually all accrue after tne demon stration 
proj ect is f inished and the new technology is adopted. 
At tne start, tne ultima L e  value of tne program is subj ect to 
three source s of uncertainty. Fir st, as sociated with each technical 
alternative i s  a range of possible outcome s in cos t  and performance. 
Second, as sociated with each alternative is a range of e stimate s of how 
long it will take �o develop the technology -- and hence a range of 
e stimate s of its discounted pre sent value given that it succeeds. 
Third, tne options pursued in each pha se depend on the results of the 
pr ece eding phase or phase s. Consequently, the sequential nature of the 
optimal R&D plan introduce s uncertainty over which technical option s 
will be pur sued to the next phase. 
Research and prototype proj ect s are undertaken becaus e  they 
provide valuable informatiun about tne new technology without requiring 
that a full commitment be made to it -- but also without proving its 
commercial viability. Because  r e search i s  relatively inexpen sive, the 
prom ise of a technical alternative can be rather problematical and 
s till be sufficient to make it worth examining. As re search proceeds,  
uncertainties  are re solved and the prom ise of alternative s becomes  
ea sier L O  distingui sh. Tne advantage of fur ther r e search is  that it 
enhance s the likelihoo d that the most prom ising alternative s will be 
identified and pursued to the prototype phase, thereby reducing the 
chance of wasting money in the phase s that are more expensive. The 
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disadvantage of deciding to µndertake further research is that it 
postpones the date on which the new technology will be adopted, and the 
benefi&s obtained, assuming that it succeeds. Tne switch from the 
initial to the prototype phase occurs when managers believe the gains 
of further research no longer justify the sum of its direct costs and 
its delaying erfects. 
Similar calculations underpin the decision about moving from 
prototypes &o a demonstration. Prototypes provide still more 
intormation and enhance the likelihood that the technology will be 
successful; however testing delays adoption. A demonstration will be 
undertaken when the additional knowledge from further testing is not 
worth delaying the try at commercializing the technology. 
The sequential nature of decision-making implies that the 
optimal level of effort in tne latter phases of the R&D program will 
not be known with certainty ex ante. This introduces a further 
complication inLo planning and evaluating an ongoing R&D program. 
The features of the optimal plan that we wish to emphasize are the 
following. First, all the salient characteristics of a program are 
measured in terms ot dollars. Funds spent on one kind of activity are 
directly compared with funds spent on another. Second, costs and 
revenues in different time periods are made comparable by discounting. 
Third, the response to uncertainty is a contingency plan: programs in 
which actions at a later aate are made contingent on information 
derived from preceeding work. Fourth, decisions whether to pro ceed to 
the next step in pursuing an alternative are based on the incremental 
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CObt of continuing another round and tue expected benefit to be derived 
therefrom in terms of the expected payot f of the program. 
Tne process is analogous &o decisions based on a series of 
updated decision trees. As work progresses through each stage, the 
distribution of discounted present benefit from each option is updated, 
and its variance presumably narrowed. This allows a revision of the 
research plan, to a new optimal choice of projects and appropriations 
based on the information then available. While the revisions depend on 
previous work, decisions are based on estimates of subsequent costs and 
benefits. Thus, as with optimal investment decisions under certainty, 
sunk costs are irrelevant to tne actual decisions made at each stage. 
The Politics of Commercialization Programs 
The foundation for our analysis of the po�itics of government 
commercialization policies is rational actor theory, which connects the 
policy-making actions of legislators to the voting decisions of their 
constituents under the assumption that citizens vote on the basis of 
self-interest and candidates seek to maximize their probability of 
staying in office. We will briefly summarize the important f eatures of 
this theory that apply &o the case at hand. The general thrust of our 
argument is that particularistic and distributional concerns are 
especially prominent in the politi�s of the later phases of 
developmental R&D programs, and therefore cause certain systematic 
inetficiencies in the way programs are implemented. 
The first element in the analysis is how citizens decide to 
participa&e in political activities : voting, lobbying, contributing to 
12 
campaigns, or joining organizations that engage in these activities. 
Casting a vote is a very incidental act to a citizen because the vote 
conveys very little information. It is a simple, dichotomous signal in 
response to a very complicated vector of policy positions and other 
attributes of the list of candidates. Moreover, a single vote has very 
little affect on the election. Consequently, a rational voter will 
devote very little time and resources to gaining expertise on the wide 
spectr\IDI ot issues that the winner will have to address in order to 
identify the candidate that best serves his or her se1f interest. 
Instead, voters will be passive, responding to information provided by 
others and assessing candidates on the basis ot highly general 
attributes and issues, plus their personal experiences with them. To 
tne extent that a voter does focus attention on positions taken by 
candidates, the issues selected will be the ones in which the voter has 
the greatest personal stake, 
Other forms of political participation differ from voting in 
two ways. First, they provide more opportunity for citizens to express 
the intensities of their preferences. Lobbying, contributing and 
participating in political groups can be undertaken with varying 
degrees of commitment. Second, because these forms of participation 
are general1y more costly than voting, a citizen must have a greater 
stake in an issue to be motivated to engage in them. 
In calculating stakes in an issue, a citizen considers personal 
rather than total so cietal benefits from the project. A citizen makes 
no distinction be tween benefits accruing from improvements in the 
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general sta Le of the nation and from public goods, on the one hand, and 
highly targeted programs that enhance the voter's income or personal 
purchasing power. Consequently, candidates will be evaluated on the 
basis of both aspects of their platforms and records, as analyzed in 
Fiorina and Noll [1 978] , While the general societal benefits of a 
program may be its most important effect, these normally are very 
diffuse. Among citizens whose only stake in the issue is in its tax 
costs and its general public benef its (or project outcome, in this 
case), the personal stakes normal1y will be too low to merit 
significant weight in voting decisions. Similarly, among citizens wno 
are directly involved in implementing a policy, the effect of the 
program on their income is likely to overshadow their evaluation of the 
policy outcome. 
This observation has three consequences of importance to this 
discussion. First, political support for a program grows as its 
distributional role increases and becomes more focused, Second, the 
ultimate outcome or success of tne program may play a secondary 
political role to the form of its implementation and may, indeed, be of 
relatively little consequence in the political calculus. Finally, voters 
with low stakes in a program are l ikely to base their voting decision 
on minimal informatiun about it, if it enters their calculus at all. 
In the case of government commercialization projects, all 
consUD1ers of tne product of industries using the technology will 
benefit if its commercial adoption is e conomically warranted, but this 
et fect will be diffused over a large nUD1ber of people with small per 
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capita stakes. People earning income in tne industry in which the 
technology will be used may also have a stake in that w arranted 
technical change may expand sales, profits and employment; however, 
this, too, is diffused over a large number of people, and may be 
dissipated by competitive entry. 
Having higher per capita stakes will be the people who are 
employed in implementing the R&D program, When facing a decision 
whether to undertake a phase of a program, including the research 
phase, the identities of the people to be employed will be to some 
extent unknown. A group that is larger than the number who eventually 
wiLl win contracts and be employed faces tne probability that the 
program will benefit them, which makes the income-generating side ot 
tne program more diffuse. Once a new phase is entered, the lucky 
winners become identified. This reduces the size of the group whose 
income depends on tne program, but raises their per capita stakes in 
the programs's continuation by a compensating amount. 
For reasons summarized above, as the per capita stakes of a 
citizen in an issue rise, he or she becomes more likely to give the 
issue substantial weight in making decisions about political 
participation. Hence, two phenomena emerge about the connection 
between political participation and commercialization projects. First, 
at each phase of the program, the particularistic elements are more 
important after the phase is entered and tne work has begun than when 
the project i s  rirst propo sed. The impli cation of thi s ob s ervation i s 
that, ceteris paribus (including tne likely success of the project), 
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projects should have less political support when tne issue is whether 
to begin a phase than later when it is to continue it. Second, because 
the rate of expenditure of the project increases from phase to phase, 
the electoral importance of the particularistic aspects of the program 
should increase as tne program moves to later phases. The implication 
here is that, ceteris paribus, the political support for a project 
should be highest in the demonstration phase and lowest in the research 
phase. 
Presumably legislators are aware ot these effects, and decide 
to enter developmental R&D programs bearing them in mind. To 
legislators, the relevant question is whether a program is worth the 
political opportunity costs in terms of tne electoral consequences of 
taxes, def icits and other programs forgone. In the spirit of the 
political benefit-cost analysis discussed in Weingast, Shepsl e  and 
J ohnson [1981] , we will compare the electoral consequences of various 
types of programs, We will tirHt examine the pure particularistic 
benefits, comparing developmental R&D programs with other ways to spend 
federal dollars on procurement and construction. Two such comparisons 
are especially relevant: feaeral construction programs that involve no 
research (tne traditional pork barrel), and military weapons systems 
development. 
To a legislator, one political advantage of these other 
programs is that they are more difficult to evaluate after they are 
completed than is a commercialization proj ect . Dams, highways, weapons 
systems, federal buildings and sewage treatment facilities do not have 
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to pass a market test by becoming adopted voluntarily by an industry . 
While the success ot any such project can be disputed, tne issue is 
certain to be more conjectural than tne rather clean test at the end of 
commercialization project: namely, does anyone want to use it? Even 
weapons systems, which face a test relatin g to their contribution to 
national security, are evaluated more in terms of pure technical 
performance -- do they meet technical specifications -- rather than 
whether a dollar measure of benefits constitutes a reasonable return on 
the dollars expended, Consequently, because of easier evaluation, 
developmental R&D programs represent more of a political risk to 
legislators than do other means of providing the same amount of 
particularistic expenditures. 
A second undesirable characteristic of demonstration programs to 
politicians is their intermittancy. Oth�r expenditure programs go on 
more or less continuously. One weapons system or federal construction 
project can be expected to be followed by anotner; indeed, the 
unanimity norm in pork barrel appropriations essentially assures this 
result, as discussed in Weingast [1978] . In contrast to this, 
demonstration projects end. For them to be replaced immediately by 
anoth�r of tne same type would cast doubt on tne value of the first 
(radica1 technical change is not supposed to be a continuous process), 
and in any event would require a return to tne less expensive research 
phase. Thus, happy constituents benefitting from these programs one 
day lo se their so urce of income without another government program 
necessarily taking its place. Legislators would pref er a less 
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intermittent way to provide particularistic expenditures . 
Tne third politically unattractive characteristic of 
commercialization programs is that, to tne extent they provide 
particularistic electoral payof fs, tney do so only after the relatively 
inexpensive and unpredictable research phase is over. Legislators will 
not know whether their constituency base will be the beneficiaries at 
the financial �y more important prototype and demonstration phases. 
And, in any case, these electoral benefits are in the future -­
normal ly several elections away. Among alternative income-creating 
expenditures, only military weapons systems share this disadvantage, 
and even here it is partially ameliorated by the fact that, for any 
given type ot weapons system, there are very few competitors J:or the 
important developmental phases, so that the ultimate political 
b�neficiaries of a commitment to develop a system are easy to guess in 
advance, In addition, weapons development leads to an even bigger 
expenditure program on weapons acquisition, with concommittantly large 
particularistic electoral benefits. By contrast, tne adoption of a new 
technology by industry will involve only private expenditures on 
investments in the new technology for which a politician will not be 
able to claim credit to constituents who are employed in this phase. 
To sum up, as a purely particularistic, pork barrel activity, 
technology demonstration projects are not very attractive to 
legislators. In tue absence of other factors influencing the political 
cal culus, we woul d not expect to see this kind of go vernment activity. 
Nevertheless, other factors do sometimes emerge that tip the balance 
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the other way. A s  s tated earlier, particularism i s  only one factor in 
electoral pol itics. Another i s  general public is sue s that achieve 
electoral salience, When performance in some sector of the society i s  
perceived to  b e  sufficiently poor, dis satisfaction i s  translated into 
an electoral demand for a policy i:o addres s tne problem. For a 
demonstration program to achieve this s tatus,  the technical performance 
of a sector of tne economy must  become salient. An example is the 
energy sector during the 1970 s in the face ot rapidly rising world 
energy prices and tne sen se of increased vulnerability i:o foreign 
source s of crude oil. The is sue of pushing the development of new 
energy technology became salient; a pas s ive subsidization program of 
the industry that was perceived to be performing poorly, while perhaps 
more promising :from tne aspect of particularistic electoral incentives, 
was not a viable response to the general public issue because it would 
have appeared to reward what was regarded as bad performance. 
A second, related political circumstance could also make 
technical demon stration project s more at tractive. It is the rise of 
polit ical sent iment against more traditional forms of particularism, 
If dams, highways and new weapon s systems come to be regarded as public 
"bads, "  which probably happened in the late 1960 s with the rise ot 
environmental and antiwar movement s in the United States, the 
di sadvantages of demonstration programs di scus sed above could be off set 
by the�r more benign feature s in tne eyes of opponent:s of more 
traditional means of delivering particularistic favors. 
Final ly, an advantage of demonstration programs is derived from 
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their positive economic value to tne industry that is ultl.lllately 
expected to  adopt the new technology. This makes it possible that a 
subs tantial part of the cos t  will be picked up by the private sector. 
If the program is clearly labeled a public program, legislators can 
still claim credit when contracts are let in their districts; however 
private sector cost sharing lowers the price tag of achieving these 
electoral benefit s. This situatio n  i s  les s  common in alternative ways 
to deliver public construction and procurement expenditures, for the 
principal output of these programs is usually government goods, not 
something of value to private busines ses. 
Implications for the Characteris t ic s  of Demons t ration Programs 
The preceeding analy si s leads to several important conclusions 
regarding the way demon stration programs will be viewed by legislators 
during the lifetime of the program, Normally, demonstrating new 
technology should not appear particularly attractive. In order for it 
to become so, one of three events has to occur : 
1. A public issue ari ses concerning the technical
performance ot a sector of the economy; 
2. Political limitation s emerge to con s train tne ext�nt
to which more prosaic pork barrel programs can be 
adopted; or 
3.  The private sector becomes willing to  bear a 
major share of the co st, while giving up enough 
control ot the program to allow politicians to 
claim credit for iLs distributive aspects. 
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Once a cODD11itment has been made to undertake a program for one 
of these three reasons,  the po litical support for the program is likel y  
to grow as tne program matures into a full-scale demon s tration. Tnis 
creates an incentive for legislators to want to move to the latter 
phases of tne program as quickly as pos sible. Because the political 
benefit s are concentrated in l ater stage s, they will want to rush the 
early phases more than would a decision-maker who seeks to maximize 
economic efficiency. Because these phases are not very amenable to 
being rushed, the effect i s  a lower chance of ultimate succes s of the 
program. 
A second source ot inefficiency follows from the nature of the 
political support in the lat ter phases of the program. As is discus sed 
above, the growth in support is due to the increase in particularistic 
benefit s :  the large-scale, concentrated expenditure s on procurement 
and construction of a demonstration program. To the ext ent that the 
program fit s tne mold of di stributive politic s ,  the standard "pork 
barrel" inefficiencie s  can be expect ed to occur. A s  is discus sed by 
Shep sle and Weingast [1980) and Weinga st,  Shep sle and J ohn son [1981), 
legi slators effectively discount the cost s of such programs because  
they generate political support. Con sequent ly, political evaluation s 
diverge from economical ly efficient evaluations of project co st s and 
benefit s,  cau sing expenditure s that are not j u s tified on economic 
grounds to be politically attractive. Thi s phenomenon is intensified 
by the uncertainty in a research and development program that pertain s 
to the demonstration phase. The actual co st s and performance of the 
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demon s tration are unlikely �o be known unt il tne proj ect i s  well 
underway. At that point a status quo has been established : a group 
has be�n created whose political support is based on continued 
expenditures for the demonstration, rather than its (economic) 
benefit s. Finally, the tendency to rush early stages of the program 
exacerbates the problem. One inefficiency due to early speedup is that 
toe program can be expected to enter the demon s tration phas e  with 
greater uncertainty over cost s and benefit s than would exi st in the 
optimal economic plan. Thus ,  the bias for early demon stration 
increases the likelihood of establishing a political support group tor 
a proj ect that is exce s sively prone to cost  overrun s and performance 
shortfal ls. The Joint etfect of these observations is that 
expenditures  on a demon s tration program that does not turn out wel l 
will be continued past  the point that is j u s tified on the basis  of co st 
and performance. 
The dimini shed chance of succes s  and the growing 
particularis tic aspects provide an incentive to decouple tne program 
from it s ultimate commercial ization goal. A s  di scus sed in Fiorina and 
Noll [1979), incumbent politician s seek to couple particularism and 
noncontroversial activities so that they can avoid running for 
reelection on truly divisive, controversial i s s ues.  A failed proj ect 
can become the l atter -- a public scandal that threatens it s advocat e s  
i n  the legislature. 
All R&D programs are uncertain, and some warranted project s 
will prove to be unsucces sful enough to de serve cancellation. To avoid 
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thi s,  a politician wi�l want tne ultimate evaluation of tne proj ect to 
be on some other ba si s than the narrow criterion of its efficien cy as a 
new technology. Hence, the politician will seek opportunities to 
change the justification of the program to something more vague, like 
the j ustification for other pork barrel and military programs. This 
gives the program a wider array of paths to ultimate succe s s, and even 
if it is a failure, makes the j ob of so identifying it more difficult. 
Once the program has entered the phases  that contain strong 
particulari stic aspects, the original commercialization goal may 
contribute little to its political popularity. At that point, goal 
tran sformation to moLe abstract concepts has little political 
liability, or in any event, les s  than that a s sociated with cancelling a 
proj ect, alienating the beneficiaries of it s distributional 
consequence s, and adlllitting a mistake (alienating everyone else). 
Examples of the kinds of vague goals a proj ect might inherit are 
national security, national prestige, and t echnology as an end in 
it self, rather than a mean s to other obj ectives. 
For these reasons, tnree general characteristics of government-
spon sored commercialization proj ects can be expected to emerge. Fir st, 
to the extent the government has a role in this area, it may have 
insutf icient reason to undertake warranted proj ects becau se the 
particularistic aspects of them are not very attractive. But once 
government undertakes a program, it ha s incentives to mismanage it by 
foresnortening the research phase, being insufficiently willing to 
retain option s and change paths of development as more information i s  
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obtained, and continuing programs after it becomes clear that the 
likel y  benefits do not warrant further investment. Third, the public 
rationale for toe program is expected to shift over time, from the 
narrow is sue of developing erficient new technologies to more vague 
goals that are les s  amenable to clear tests of succes s. 
II. CLINl.'H RIV ER AND THE U.S. B.KEEDER REA CT OR PROGRAM
The U.S. breeder reactor effort is a continuation of 
government-sponsored civilian nuclear power research, the origins of 
which date back to World War II. Breeder research got underway about 
the time that the light-water (LWR) became commercial, and its 
development program was termed a succes s, in the mid-1960 s .l At this 
time, tne prospect s for nuclear power looked very bright. As a result, 
advanced reactor design s that were more fuel-effic_ient than LWRs2 
appeared to be highl y  desirable. An AE C study, complete in l9b 7, 
concluded that the liquid-metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR ) technology 
1. The oreeder program received considerable support directly after 
World War II culminating in the fir st U.S. LMFBR cal led EBR-I. In 
1951, EBR-I, a 150 KWe reactor, actually generated the first electricity 
to come from fis sion in this country. EBR-I  s uffered a meltdown 
accident in 1955, was repaired, and was finally decommis sioned in 19b4. 
A second experimental breeder, EBR-II, rated at 16MW, came on line in 
l9b3, and r emains operational today. The third early breeder, FERMI-I, 
a 60 MWe LMFBR, was built under the cooperative power reactor 
development program by Commonwealth Edi son and the AEC. After 
difficult licen sing and court battles, tne plant went critical in 
l9b3. Tests to bring the plant up to full power began in l9b6, and the 
plant suffered a partial core meltdown during one te st. It was 
repaired and again became critical in 1972, but because of licensing 
and economic is sues, the plant did not resume commercial operation and 
has been de commissioned. 
2. In theory, a liquid-metal, fast-breeder reactor can use up to 90 
percent of the energy in uranium, a factor of 70 better than LWKS. 
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showed greatest promi se, and should be emphsized for development.3 The 
program to build an important test facil ity (the Fast Flux Test 
Facility, or FFTF) began in 1968, and simultaneou sly, discus sion 
started about building several demonstration plants. The original plan 
called for government and indu stry to share the cose s of three LMFBRs, 
spaced two year s apart during the 19/0s. This was to be followed by 
commercial facilitie s without federal participation. In the optimism  
of the late 1960 s about the prospect s for LWRs and nuclear power in 
general, coupled with e stimated growth rate s in electricity consumption 
of s ix to seven percent per year, a commercially viable breeder 
industry was projected for the early 1980 s. 
In l9b�. negotiations began tor the fir st demonstration : the 
Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR). The original plan was that the 
facility would cost $200 million, with the government paying 40 percent 
of the costs and electric utilitie s the remaining 60 percent. It wa s 
to be completed by l97H, with expenditure s  beginning in tiscal 1970.
Risks of cost overrun s were to be assumed by the reactor manufacturer, 
in the spirit of the "turnkey" era of light-ater reactors a few year s 
before.4 By the fiscal 1982 budget, the cost estimate had escalated to
3. At the same time, Admiral Rickover and the Navy developed a light
water breeder u sing a thorium-uranium cycle. The LWBR at Shippingport 
went critica1 in 1977 and is now being decommis sioned and evaluated. 
While more fuel-etf icient than the LWR, the LWBR is nowhere near as  
fuel-efficient a s  the LMb'BR. Its main advantage appears to be its 
ability to utilize thorium. 
4. Burnes s, Montgomery and Quirk [1980). That the turnkey episode 
nearly bankrupted manufacturer s of light-water reactor s seems to have 
been overlooked by of ficials wno planned to duplicate the program for 
breeders. 
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$3 billion with tne government as suming virtually the entire cost 
increase. No construction had yet been started even though several 
hundred million dollar s nad already been s pent, and tne expected 
completion date was 1990 -- that is, in twelve years the time horizon 
for completing the proj ect had not advanced at all. The subsequent 
demonstration proj ecc s have been abandoned, and (to date) alternative 
re search plan s have not received any significant appropriation. 
Tne focus of this section is on CRBR, the demonstration phase 
of the R&D program. Unfortunately, it illustrate s many of the negative 
attributes ot a government- sponsored R&D program that were discu s sed in 
the previous section. It was supported by Congres s  for year s after its 
initial economic rationale di sappeared. The proces s  of goal 
tran sformation is particulariy marked : indeed, as even the more 
abstract goals failed, they continued to be replaced by other, vaguer 
goals,  while the original phy sical concept of the reactor remained 
unchanged. 
The arrangements regarding CRBK changed dramatical ly over the 
1970 s. Tne initial estimates of $ 200 million, a 1978 completion date, 
and private as sumption ot risk evaporated before any contracts were 
signed with utilities. Tne agreement reached in 1972 was based on the 
following term s : the proj ect co st was estimated at $ 70 0  million, or 
which utilitie s would provide $250 million. The government assumed 
responsibility for cost overrun s and provided other financial 
indemnif i cation for its industrial collaborators. Although legislation 
was needed to implement the agreement, tne AEC and the lead utilities 
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TVA and CommollWealth Edison -- commenced licensing activities before 
it pas sea. They immediately ran into trouble as proj ect opponents (the 
fir st was the Natural Resource Defense Council) seized on the 
commercial look-alike aspects of the proj ect to challenge it. The 
commercial features  gave rise to a need for variou s licenses and 
environmental reviews, providing opportunities f or intervention and due 
proce ss co intervenor s. Licensing difficulties continued LO plague the 
proj ecc a s  the D.C. Circuit Court, the EPA, and the NRC Ln succession 
have been unable to obtain neces sary environmental and safety 
guarantees to license the plant as required by its semi-commercial 
status. Because of tne lack of s ufficient research and prototypes, 
this intormation has simply not been available. 
A thorough study of the LMFBR program in 1974 came up with 
start!ing results. ERDA published a proj ected cost for CRHR of $1. 7 
billion, and estimated that con struction could not commence until 1980. 
New authorizing legisl ation was clearly needed. In 197 ), Congress 
reauthorized tne program, but s pecified a lead management role by ERDA, 
as government anticipated assuming an additional billion dollars Ln 
proj ect costs. The utilities held firm at $250 million. 
At about this time the original rationale for the proj ect came 
under serious criticism. By 1975,  various factor s, including cost 
overrun s, technology problems, public opposition, and declining energy 
use, had caused a sharp dowllW'ard revision in the proj ected growth rate 
of LWR capacity. Consequently, the projected benefits from a fuel­
saving nuclear technology fell, and the desired dace for a breeder 
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industry was extended LO about the year 2000, although considerable
controversy remained about this date. Second, substantial concern was 
voiced about the desirability to build CRBR on technical grounds: the 
desLgn was ten years old and, according to some (although hotly 
disputed) , technically obsolete. Final ly, the enhanced federal role 
and subordinated utility commitment strained the claim that the 
technology was near commer cialization. 
The cost estimates and technica! problems continued to grow. 
By 1978 -- when the Carter Administration attempted to kill the proj ect 
the date at which the breeder industry was predicted to emerge had 
be�n extended to 2020. Tne obsolescence claLm was receLving more 
support : indeed, this  was given by the administration among its 
reason s for its attempt LO cancel Clinch River. By 1981 the cost 
estimate stood at $2.8 billion. Despite support of the Reagan 
Administration, con struction at Clinch River had not begun, and the NRC 
had not yet issued the necessary construction permits. 
An optimal economic response to cost and licen sing difficulties 
and declinLng e stimated benefits would be a reemphasis of research, 
but the opposiLe actually took place. CRBR was initially intended to 
be only a small component of the program: in 19b 9 ics total cost was 
estimated at 2.4 percent of the total anticipated expenditures on 
developing nucl.ear technology. In 1972, that figure stood at 6 . 7 
percent; in 1975, it was 19.3 percent; and by 1981 it reached 30
percent. Mor eover, the growth in suppor t  for CKHR came at the expense 
of research activitie s. The total e stimated cost of the breeder 
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program between 1978 and 1982 dropped from $12 billion to $10 billion, 
although the CRBK component estimate increased 36 percent. Thus CRBK
had moved from being oue small part of the program to it:s centr al 
component. 
Thl.s all took place even though, had the original expectations 
about its cost, performance and technical value panned out, CRBR still 
would not have become a commer cially viable technology for another 
half-century. Support for CRBR came at tue expense of resear ch 
activities. Inaeed, the total estimated cost of the breeder program 
between 1978 and 1982 dropped from $12 billion to $10 billion, although 
the CRBR component estimate increased 36 percent. Meanwhile continued 
Congressional support of CRBR from 1970 to 1982 was accompanied by 
moaification of its goals. The 1970 authorizing legislation states 
that : 
"Design guidelines for the demonstration plant stress 
maximum use of existing technology to reduce technical 
risks and assure safe reliable operation. 
Maj or obj ectives will be to (1) demonstrate the 
technica1 performance, reliability, maintainabil ity, 
safety, environmental acceptability and e conomic 
feasibil ity in a utility environment of an LMl!'BR 
central electric power station and (2) confirm the 
value ot this concept for conserving important non-
renewable natural resources. " (U.S. Congress (1976], p, 71) 
By 1975, it was not clear if CRBR would accomplish these goals. 
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While supporters continued to  espouse them, other rationales were 
added. Chief among them was national prestige ("the French are 
threatening to take the ba1 l away from us • • •  ") , the difficulty in 
restarting a program, and (despite controversy) greater emphasis on the 
technical knowledge that would emerge from the program. 
By 1979, retreat from the commercial ization goal was making the 
commer cial licensing process -- a maj or roadblock -- seem rather silly. 
However, avoiding it was only possible if, as �arter proposed, the 
proj ect was dumped and an entirely new proj ect was started that 
emphasized research and prototype development and was J.ocated on a 
federal reservation. Congres s responded to this proposal by making 
licensing itself a primary goal, A GAO report states this succinctly : 
" [the utilities have] serious reservations about 
the possibil ity that DOE will build the large plant 
on a Federal reservation and not subj ect it to the 
scrutiny of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission',s 
fu1 l  licen sing process. In tne utilities' view, 
licensing the constuction and operation of a breeder 
reactor is the mo st formidable hurdle that must be 
crossed in demonstrating breeder technology. 
Another concern is the negative impact this retreat 
from public scrutiny might have on public confidence 
in and ac ceptance of breeder reactors. In the 
present climate ot public concern and debate on 
nuclear safety, the DOE plan is not appropriate. 
The recent accident at Three Mile Island nuclear 
power plant has intensified this concern and debate 
over nuclear reactor safety. In this case, a water­
cooled reactor, designed and constructed after a 
long series of gradual reactor scaleups experienced 
unanticipated events that resulted in releases ot 
radioactive materials and serious reactor core 
damage. This event underscores the utilities' 
point that today and for tne foreseeable future, 
gaining early public confidence and acceptance may 
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be ditficult but are as important as establishing 
technica.a. and economic viability." (GAO, [ 1979], p. 16)
Finally, by 1981 tne project goals stated by DuE Secretary 
Edwards avoid economic etficiency altogether. He Justified tederal 
expenditures on this project (as opposed to other energy demonstrate 
projects) because Clinch River 
represents a "long-term high-risk R&D venture"; 
enhances national security; 
realizes the potential ot nuclear power; 
contributes to non-proliferation goals; and 
"industry cannot be expected to invest 
significantly in CRBR when government decisions 
have so abruptly changed and voided past private 
sector investments. " (U.S. Congress [1981]) 
The lesson of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor as we interpret 
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it is as follows. The government, once committed to a large-scale, 
technology-forcing demonstration project, faced great difficulty in 
turning it off. This observation has nothing to do with tne wisdom of 
the nuclear power strategy for future energy development, nor of the 
breeder concept. Assuming that the United States must continue to 
depend heavily on nuclear power and, by 20 20 or some such date, must 
have a commercialized breeder technology, the conclusion still remains 
that Clinch River should have been canceled several years ago. The 
attenuated time horizon for its need, the unanticipated technical 
problems, and the results of the Phoenix demonstration in France all 
should have led to a major reemphasis in the breeder reactor program 
towards research on components of the system where technical 
uncertainties remained. But once a commitment was made to 
demonstration, it proved difficult to reverse. 
The source of the continuing commitment to tne project has been 
Congress. In nearly every year since 1970, Congress has appropriated 
more for the project than was requested by the President. And, in the 
late 1970s, the Carter Administration tried to reallocate substantial 
portions of the Clinch River budget to the larger research program in 
civilian reactors generally and the specific research program dedicated 
to liquid metal fast breeders. In fiscal 1979, Congress more than 
doubled the President's request for CRHK, and in riscal 1980 and 1981, 
when the President requested nothing for the Clinch River program, 
Congress continued to provide tull funding, 
In this case, Congressional allegiance to a particular 
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cost per pound of payload went up dramatically. 
All ot this became evident in the late 19/ 0s. Between 197) and 
1976, the number ot mis sion s was cut back to 572, and ultimately in 
1982 to 312. Cost overrun s appeared to be mode st at tirst, with 
expected development costs increa sing about $200 million per year (1971 
dollars ) from 1977 to 19/ 9; however, in 1980 and 1981, these costs 
jumped another $1 billion (1971$) . The date of the tirst flight was 
al so being delayea : to March 1979 in 1 9/ 3, to �eptember 1979 in 197 8,  
and eventually to tue actual date of April 12,  1981. Thus, the sy stem 
ended up being delayea by 33 percent, being 30 percent more expen sive 
than was initially projected, and having 55 percent fewer mis sions. On 
a cost per mis s ion basis, the co st overrun w as about 150 percent. 
In addition to the overrun in development costs, launch costs 
also e scalated. The intent ot NASA was to price the space shuttle 
launches so as to recover the cost s of commercialization, but not the 
research et fort. For launches f or commercial organizations, foreign 
countries and agencies other than the Department of Defen se and NASA, 
the launch price established by NASA was $1�  million per launch (197)$ ) 
in 1977, DOD, becau se it was con structing it s own launch facilities,  
was  to be charged for the consumables only at a price of $12 million. 
By J une 1982, the commercial launch price -- calculated on the same 
bas i s  -- had e scalated to $38 million (1975$ ) ,  an increase of 122 
percent, while the DOD price reached $28 million in 1983 ( also 1975$ ) ,  
an incr ease o f  1 3 3  percent . 5 
5 .  "Shuttle Cost Impact. 11 Ayiation Week and Space Technology, 
(March 28, 1983) : 13. 
35 
These cos t-overrun s led to drastic cut s  in tue mo st 
dramatically succes sful part of the space program during the period, 
the unmanned photographic mis sion s to tue planets (and the attendant 
scientific work that occupied most of the space on these missions ) . 
Thi s was ironic, for one main purpose of the s pace shuttle was to 
reduce launch costs of deep space missions so that, among other things, 
the nation could afford more and better s pace science. But durin g the 
summer of 191 9 ,  as Congres s  became aware of severe shuttle R&D cost 
overruns,  all of NASA' .. s projects came under financial scrutiny. 
Representative Edward P. Boland (D-Mas s.) , chairman of the HUD and 
Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Hou se Appropriation s 
Committee, sugge sted a fiscal 1980 cut of $113 million t or the space 
telescope and $116 million for the Gal ileo Project to orbit J upiter, 
 remarking that "Galileo won't mind." 6 Congres s  -did not cut either 
program, and it did grant $485 million in NASA supplementals over the 
next two years, while increasing its tiscal year 1980 budget by $ 220 
million. Nevertheles s, this action was not s ufficient to absorb the 
shuttle overrun, and caused reductions or cancellations in other 
programs. It als o  led to the rejection by the Otf ice of Management and 
Budget or the Congres s  of nearly all of NASA's propo sed new starts f rom 
1979 through 1982. In November, 1979,  for example, tnree new programs 
were rejected by OMB : 
( ! J  The solar electric propulsion sy stem, with
pro po sed f i s cal y e ar 1 9 81 funas of $20 mil l io n
6 .  1 1i;i600 Million Shuttle Cost Overrun Startles Congres s  ...  Ayiation 
� .!ill!! Space Technology, (May 7, 1979) : 18-20 .
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demonstration has nad a dramat ic impact on the development program. 
Inaeed, in justifying continuation of the program, the goal of 
development was more-or-le�s abandoned, Current plans call for 
cont inuing t he project only if utilities assume a far greater portion 
of the financial burden. This tactic may be a graceful way to exit 
from the CRBR field, However, we expect that CRBR proponents are right 
in predicting that any replacement is unlikely in the short run. 
U ti! ities are likely to evaluate the program on economic grounds, and 
at this point only an entirely new plan t o  manage breeder R&D could 
possibly make sense economically. Even this is doubt ful, because of 
the decline in the potential fuel-saving benefits of breeders even if 
they work. Thus, even a redirected program probably requires heavy 
governmeut involvemeut in financing it. The condit ions that made such 
a program politically attractive in 19b 7 no longer hold. Opposition 
and concern have replaced opt imism with regards to nuclear power 
technology, making t he proj ect controversial among t he constituencies 
of many legislators. Current LWR capacity projections imply a need for 
breeders only far into the future, so that the demonstration phase 
cannot be economical1y justified for a very long time. 
III. THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
The original purpose of the space shut tle was to develop a 
commercially viable space transportation system that used reusable 
l aunch vehicles to carry large payloads at a cost per pound that was 
much lower than could be achieved wi Lh expendable launch vehicles. The 
commercial aim was twofold : to  reduce the costs of launches for 
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civilian and military space programs, and to achieve low enough costs 
for business to f ind space commercial ly attractive for some 
manufacturing activities. In addition, the space shut tle served NASA�s 
objective of keeping manned space f l ight the center of the space 
program, on tne heels of the successful Mercury and Apo!lo programs. 
Of course, building a reusable launch vehicle that was capable 
of carrying a manned crew and a very large payload was known to be very 
expensive compared to building an expendable launcher for smal ler 
payloads. Tne plan was to make up the cost differential by using the 
space shut tle very frequently over a usetul life of a dozen years, 
When the space shut tle was proposed to Congress in 1971, the 
cost of deve!op1ng it was estimated at $5. 15 billion, The first launch 
was scheduled for March 1978. The space shut tles were expected to  
operate for twe1 ve years, undertaking a total ot . 7 25  missions. 
Unfortunat ely, as work on the space shut tle progressed, 
unanticipated problems arose -- as might naturally be expect ed in any 
research and developmeut activity that attempts such a great leap 
forward in technology. For one thing, expectations about the size ot 
tne payload had to be scaled back as it became clear that the space 
shut tle was going to have substantially less power at !aunch than was 
originally hoped, For another thing, the turn-around t ime on the 
ground had t o  be longer, and cost much more, tnan was initially 
expected because tne vehicle was less resilient, and more vulnerable t o  
i t s  own snaking a t  l aunch, than w a s  ini t i al ly expe cted. Of co ur se,
smaller payloaas and less frequent, more costly launches meant that the 
and 3-year R&D runout of $262 mil lion ( this 
etfect ively kil led the U.S. invol vement in the 
proposed joint U.S./European Hal ley's comet/ 
Tempel 2 probe, wnich carried with it an 
additional NASA price tag of $400 million 
over three year s); 
( 2) NASA invol vement in a Joint NASA/Defense 
Department/Commerce Department National Oceanic 
Satellite System, with proposed t iscal year 1981 
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funas of $6 million and 6-year runout of $179 mil lion; 
( j J  Shuttle Power Extension Package, a device to 
extend shuttle orbital stays from seven to 20 
days,  with $17 million proposed by fiscal year 1981 
and a 3-year R&D runout of $150 million , 
Augmenting these moves was NASA' s continuation of transferrng shuttle 
funds from production to R&D in an attempt to keep the tir st flight on 
schedule. An interesting feedback ef fect of these actions was to 
further reduce both the demand for launches and the capabilities of the 
shuttle sy stem, two of the main reasons NASA was torced to scale back 
its 12-year mis sion potential to jl2. 
The rational bu sine s s  strategy circa 19/ 8  would have been to 
reorient tne program. More re search was clearly going to be r equired 
on both the l aunch sy stem and the spacecraft itself if the obj ectives 
of l ow  co s t s and l ar ge payloads w ere t o  be achieved.  Meanwhile,  great 
progr es s had been made on expendable vehicles, which were providing 
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increasingly reliable and inexpen sive service. Thus, continued primary 
reliance on expendable launch technology, with a space shuttle program 
de signed more for re search and development purposes than for 
commercial ization, was a preferable option for all concerned : tne 
military, NASA and potential private sector customer s ,  
Instead, the government redef ined its goal s i n  the space 
shuttle program and proceeded to convert it to the only American launch 
sy stem. The policy became the following : { l J  to base the American 
launch system on the neces sity to use men as pilots, rather than 
unmanned system s, as an end in itself, rather than because the former 
was a more cost-effective approach; and ( 2) to redefine the purpo ses of 
the space program as being those things that best suit the shuttle, 
rather than designing a launch system to perform tne mo st desirable 
objectives. By the 1980 s, all space science mis s ions had to be 
designed to u se tne shuttle, even though that meant u sing a more 
expensive launch system ( and thereby fewer missions tor a given budget) 
and ruling out some of the more promising mis sion s for which the 
shuttle was un suited ( even though they would be cheaper than the les s 
de s irable substitutes that the shuttle could handle) . 
The space shuttle program demonstrates the tenaciousne s s  w ith 
which government demon stration programs cling to life long after their 
commercial appropriatenes s  has been called in question. The cost to 
the American s pace effort may well be that we lose our leader ship. 
Whil e  the U . S .  has been developing t h e  space shut t l e, the Europe an 
Space Agency has been developing the next generation of expendable 
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launch vehicles, the Ariane, and a J une 1982 Of f ice of Technology 
Assessment report stated that this and other foreign competition is 
beginning t o  threaten U. S. leadership in commercially profitable and 
politically siginif icant space technology. In particular, the report 
notes that, due to the co st increases and schedule delays of the 
shuttle, a number of U . S. businesses have opted for the satellite­
launch services of Ariane. In the U. S. , private compan ies have 
announced their intentions to compe te with NASA t or launching 
communications satellites, using expendable launch vehicles of mid-
19/ 0s vintage. Meanwhile, the space shuttle has caused us to cancel 
our participation in one maj or multinational exploration proj ect, the 
International Solar-Polar Mission, and to be the only country active in 
space that will not investigate Halley's Comet when it passes in 1986.  
The J apanese, Europeans, Canadians and Russians will all be there. 
Meanwhile, there is some chance that the space shut tle wil l still not 
be capable ot launching its first spacecraft f or planetary exploration, 
Galileo, in 1986. 
Were the sacrifice ot scientif ic obj ectives accompanied by a 
commercially usable vehicle, the cost /benef it calculation would at 
least have some chance of proving the program worthwhile, But the 
program has no significant benefits that could not have been achieved 
by a sca1ea down program : one or two space shuttles instead of five, 
one space shuttle port (at Kennedy Space Cent er) rather than two (the 
se cond i s  at V andenberg ) ,  and cont inuation of paral lel  development of
expendable vehicles . The space shuttle was pushed too fast an d is now 
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not an attractive technology, Yet we have placed almost total reliance 
on the new technology long before it is ready, The impact on other 
elemencs of the space program -- both research and utilization 
accivities is to retard progress, and perhaps cost the nation 
leadersnip in a maj or n ew  technical arena. 
IV ,  CUNCLUD!Nu REMARKS 
The histories of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and the 
spaceshuttle seem to bear out the theoretical analysis provi ded in 
Seccion I. Both were commercialization proj ects connected to  generally 
popular issues in the late 1960s : manned s pace f light and nuclear 
power. Both were continuations ot an interrupted developmental 
research proj ect involving substantial public participation : light­
water nuclear reaccors (a commercial ization proj ec� ) and the Apollo 
program to put a man on tne moon (a technical obj ective -- more like a 
weapons system) , Both predecessors were widely regarded as successes, 
and both had substantial industrial resources behind them, 
Both Clin ch River and the space shuttle were initial ly sold to 
Congress on the basis of their economic attractiveness, The case for 
Clinch River was quite strong, given that one believed the proj ections 
of the growch of nuclear power, for breeders best solved the problems 
of fuel supply and waste disposal that were inherent in a large-scale 
nuclear en ergy industry, The space shuttle was more problematical; 
how ever, it one believed the cost, performan ce and launch demand 
analysis provided by NASA and the Department of Defense, the space 
shuctle was a reasonable proposition -- especially if one also believed 
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that public support for manned s pace programs would not wane after the 
excitement ot the Apollo project died down. 
Once tne projecL s  began, technical problems began to emerge 
that cast the initial justification s  f or them in doubt. It became 
apparent that both programs had pushed to the commercialization phase 
too q uickly, that attenuation of both programs to undertake more 
re search and experimentation was called for. It was al so apparent that 
the demand for l>Oth technologies was going to be much les s  than 
initial�y was expected. Yet by the time of this realization, the 
s izeof both programs had become large. As the cost overrun s and 
performance shortfall s  mounted, Congres s  could not find the will to 
slow down, let alone kil l, either project. 
In stead of changing tne program, the respon se of the political 
advocates was to change the objectives. For Glinch River, it became a 
ludicrous pronuclear issue :  demon strating that the U.S. government 
could overcome antinuclear activists and bureaucratic sloth to license, 
build and operaLe a breeder reactor having no economic or technical 
rationale. For the space shuttle, the change was more subtle. In stead 
of being a launch vehicle for achieving various objective s in s pace, 
the objectives in space were redetined to be things that were 
compatible with the Shuttle. In both programs the casualtie s were mo st 
of the research in the same general areas : other nuclear technologies, 
and s pace science and solar sytem exploration. 
These are but two cases t rom among a much longer list of 
government commercialization projects. A more thorough and 
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comprehen sive study of this category of programs must be undertaken 
before we can claim to have a solid understanding of the political 
economy of commercialization programs. Moreover, these two examples 
were implemented in a particular form -- a government-managed 
development program. Because this implementation strategy i s  mo st 
closely connected to the normal Congres sional budgetary proce s s, it has 
maximum vulnerability to the influences described in this paper. 
Several other methods of implementation have been tried with other 
programs : the creation of a quasi-public corporation (the Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation ) ,  government market guarantees to induce private­
sector innovations (a minimum guaranteed price or a minimum guaranteed 
market from government procurement ) ,  targeted tax incentives tor 
private demon stration projects (solar thermal energy and con servation ) ,  
and tournaments among competing suppliers o f  technical advance s  (the 
photovoltaics commercialization program) .  Each approach must be 
examined to determine if its greater distancing from particularistic 
pres s ures on Congres s  provides di stinctly different performance 
characteristics. 
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